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Abstract—In this paper, based on directional modulation
(DM), robust beamforming matrix design for sum secrecy rate
maximization is investigated in multi-user systems. The base
station (BS) is assumed to have the imperfect knowledge of the
direction angle toward each eavesdropper, with the estimation
error following the Von Mises distribution. To this end, a
Von Mises distribution-Sum Secrecy Rate Maximization (VMD-
SSRM) method is proposed to maximize the sum secrecy rate by
employing semi-definite relaxation and first-order approximation
based on Taylor expansion to solve the optimization problem.
Then in order to optimize the sum secrecy rate in the case
of the worst estimation error of direction angle toward each
eavesdropper, we propose a maximum angle estimation error-
SSRM (MAEE-SSRM) method. The optimization problem is
constructed based on the upper and lower bounds of the
estimated eavesdropping channel related coefficient and then
solved by the change of the variable method. Simulation results
show that our two proposed methods have better sum secrecy
rate than zero-forcing (ZF) method and signal-to-leakage-and-
noise ratio (SLNR) method. Furthermore, the sum secrecy rate
performance of our VMD-SSRM method is better than that of
our MAEE-SSRM method.
Index Terms—Directional modulation, multi-user systems, di-
rection angle estimation error, beamforming, artificial noise, sum
secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the explosive growth of the mobile Internet, wireless
communications have played an increasingly important role in
daily life [1], [2]. However, due to the inherent broadcasting
nature of the wireless communications, the transmit signals are
easily wiretapped by the unauthorized receivers. Therefore,
wireless communications are facing the serious privacy and
security problems. Traditional communication methods based
on the cryptographic techniques need an additional secure
channel for private key exchanging, which may be insufficient
with the development of the mobile Internet [3]–[5]. Recently,
physical layer security exploiting the characteristics of the
wireless channels can realize the secure wireless communica-
tions without the upper layer data encryption, being identified
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as a significant complement to cryptographic techniques [6]–
[9].
Directional modulation (DM), which is regarded as one of
the promising physical layer wireless security techniques, has
attracted wide attentions in recent years [10]–[20]. The main
ideal of DM is to project the confidential information signals
into the desired spatial directions while simultaneously distort-
ing the constellation of the signals in the other directions [10].
In [11], the authors proposed a DM method which employed
the near-field direct antenna modulation technique to overcome
the security challenges. A similar simplified method of DM
synthesis was proposed in [12] for a far-field scenario. With
the development of the artificial noise (AN) aided technique,
DM has been further developed. The AN is added to the
transmit signals expecting that the AN would interfere with the
eavesdroppers and not affect the legitimate receivers. In [13],
a novel baseband signal synthesis method was proposed to
construct the AN signal based on the null space of the channel
vector in the desired direction. An orthogonal projection (OP)
method in [10] was designed for the multi-beam DM systems.
And in [14], the authors proposed a multiple-direction DM
transmission scheme which employed the space domain to
transmit the multiple data streams independently and increased
the capacity of the system.
All the methods mentioned above assumed that the trans-
mitter knows the precise direction angles toward all users
(including the eavesdroppers). However, in practical scenarios,
the perfect direction angles are hard to obtain because of
the estimation errors induced by the widely-used estimation
algorithms such as multiple signal classification (MUSIC)
and Capon. So in [21] the authors considered a single-user
DM system where the estimation error of the direction angle
toward the desired receiver was assumed to follow the uniform
distribution. [22] considered the imperfect desired direction
angles in a multi-beam DM scenario, and assumed the desired
direction angle estimation errors follow the truncated Gaussian
distribution.
Compared to the direction angles of the desired receivers,
the precise direction angles toward the eavesdroppers are more
difficult to be obtained as they rarely expose their accurate
locations. In this paper, we consider the imperfect direction
angles toward eavesdroppers. Moreover, since the Von Mises
distribution is regarded as the best statistical model for the
direction angles, we assume that the angle estimation error fol-
lows the Von Mises distribution [23]. Meanwhile, the transmit
beamforming technique and the AN-aided technique are also
employed to realize the secure wireless communications. The
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2main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a Von Mises distribution-Sum Secrecy Rate
Maximization (VMD-SSRM) robust DM scheme which de-
signs the robust signal beamforming matrix and AN beam-
forming matrix on the assumption that the estimation errors
of direction angles toward the eavesdroppers follow the Von
Mises distribution. First, the expectation of the estimated
eavesdropping channel related coefficient is derived. Then the
system sum secrecy rate maximization problem subject to
the total transmit power of the base station (BS) is formu-
lated. Comprising the logarithms of the product of fractional
quadratic functions, the sum secrecy rate expression is non-
convex and difficult to tackle. In order to solve this problem,
we employ semi-definite relaxation and first-order approxi-
mation based on Taylor expansion to transform the original
problem into a convex problem.
2) In order to optimize the system sum secrecy rate in the
case of the worst estimation error of direction angle toward
each eavesdropper, we propose a maximum angle estimation
error-SSRM (MAEE-SSRM) method. To design the robust
signal beamforming matrix and AN beamforming matrix, first
the upper and lower bounds of the estimated eavesdropping
channel related coefficient are derived, then the system sum
secrecy rate maximization problem based on the derived
upper and lower bounds is constructed. Since the optimization
problem is still non-convex, we use the change of the variable
method to convert it into a convex problem and then solve it
by convex optimization tools.
3) Through simulation and evaluation, we investigate the
performance of our two proposed methods. We compare our
methods with some typical DM methods such as ZF method
[24] and SLNR method [25]. Simulation results show that our
two proposed robust methods have much better sum secrecy
rate than ZF method and SLNR method. Meanwhile the
performance of our VMD-SSRM method is better than that
of MAEE-SSRM method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the channel model and the system model. In Section
III, we design the information beamforming matrix and AN
beamforming matrix to maximize the worst-case system sum
secrecy rate with the VMD-SSRM method. In Section IV, we
consider the maximum angle estimation error of the eaves-
dropper and design the information beamforming matrix and
AN beamforming matrix to maximize the worst-case system
sum secrecy rate with the MAEE-SSRM method. Section V
provides the simulation results to validate the effectiveness of
the two proposed methods as well as the complexity of our
two proposed methods, and followed by our conclusions in
Section VI.
Notations: In this paper, we use boldface lowercase and up-
percase letters to denote the vectors and matrices, respectively.
AT , AH , Tr(A), rank(A) and Re{A} denote the transpose, the
conjugate transpose, the trace, the rank and the real part of the
matrix A, respectively. A  0 denotes that A is a positive semi-
definite matrix. | · | and ‖·‖ denote the module of the scalars
and the Frobenius norm of the matrices. E{·}, log(·), log10(·)
and In(·) denote the statistical expectation, the logarithm to
base 2, the logarithm to base 10 and the natural logarithm,
respectively. 〈x, y〉 denotes the inner product of the vector x
and y. Cm×n denotes the set of all complex m × n matrices.
IM denotes an M ×M identity matrix. x ∼ CN(0, σ2) denotes
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable x
with zero mean and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Channel Model
In this paper, the DM transmitter is assumed to be equipped
with uniform isotropic array. The array is composed of N
elements with an adjacent distance of l, while the direction
angle between the transmit antenna array and the receiver
is denoted by θTR. The normalized steering vector for the
transmit antenna array is expressed as
hˆ(θTR)= 1√
N
[e j2piΨθTR (1), e j2piΨθTR (2),· · ·, e j2piΨθTR (N )]T , (1)
where ΨθTR (n) is
ΨθTR (n) = −
(
n − (N + 1)/2
)
l cos (θTR)
λ
, n = 1, 2,· · ·, N, (2)
where λ is the wavelength of the transmit signal radio.
In the line of sight (LOS) communication scenarios, e.g.,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) communication and suburban
mobile communication, it is widely accepted to use free-space
path loss model [26], given by
PL(d) = 10log10
(4pidf
c
)2
, (3)
where PL(d) is the path loss in dB at a given distance d, f is
the frequency of the transmit signal radio and c is the radio
velocity. Then according to (1) and (3), the channel model
between the transmit antenna array and the receiver can be
expressed as
h(θTR) =
√( c
4pidTR f
)2
× hˆ(θTR)
=
√
gTR
1√
N
[e j2piΨθTR (1), e j2piΨθTR (2), · · · , e j2piΨθTR (N )]T ,
(4)
where dTR is the distance between the transmit antenna array
and the receiver, and gTR =
(
c
4pidTR f
)2
denotes the path loss
between the transmit antenna array and the receiver.
B. Multi-User System Model with Multiple Eavesdroppers
In this paper, we consider a flat fading multiuser multi-input
single-output (MU-MISO) downlink system as shown in Fig.
1. The system comprises a BS with N transmit antennas, M
(M < N) single-antenna destination users Di (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M),
and K single-antenna eavesdroppers Ek (k = 1, 2, · · · ,K),
wishing to wiretap the confidential information sent from
the BS to the destination users. The total transmit power of
the BS is Pt , and the direction angle between the BS and
each destination user is θBDi (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M). The transmit
beamforming technique is employed by the BS to steer the
M information signal beams toward the destination users. The
direction angle between the BS and each eavesdropper is θBEk
3D1
Main channel
Eavesdropping channel
Base 
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Fig. 1. Multi-User Downlink System Model with Multiple Eavesdroppers
(k = 1, 2, · · · ,K). In order to decode the confidential messages
sent from the BS to all destination users, the eavesdroppers
are assumed to locate closer to the BS than the destination
users. And in order to interfere with the eavesdroppers, the
BS employs the beamforming technique to steer L (L ≤ N)
AN beams toward the eavesdroppers. These AN beams are
transmitted along with the information signal beams, thus the
received information signal qualities of the eavesdroppers are
degraded. Let xˆ = [x1, · · · , xM ]T denote the signal vector
formed by the M independent data streams sent from the
BS to the destination users with E{xˆxˆH } = IM . Let Wˆ =
[w1, · · · ,wM ] ∈ CN×M and Qˆ = [q1, · · · , qL] ∈ CN×L denote
the information beamforming matrix and the AN beamforming
matrix, respectively. The total transmit signals of the BS can
be expressed as
x =
M∑
m=1
wmxm +
L∑
l=1
qlzl, (5)
where zl is the AN signal sent by the BS. Then the received
signal at the i-th destination user Di is given by
yDi = h
H (θBDi )x + nDi
= hH (θBDi )wi xi +
M∑
m=1
m,i
hH (θBDi )wmxm
+
L∑
l=1
hH (θBDi )qlzl + nDi ,
(6)
where the first term of the right hand side of (6) is the
useful signal received by Di , the second one is the multiuser
interference from other destination users, the third one is the
AN, and the last one is the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) with nDi ∼CN(0, σ2D).
Similarly, the signal received at the k-th eavesdropper Ek is
yEk = h
H (θBEk )x + nEk
= hH (θBEk )wi xi +
M∑
m=1
m,i
hH (θBEk )wmxm
+
L∑
l=1
hH (θBEk )qlzl + nEk ,
(7)
where the right hand side of (7) is composed of the i-th con-
fidential message intercepted by Ek , the messages sent to the
other (M-1) destination users that are intercepted by Ek , the
AN to disturb Ek and the AWGN satisfying nEk ∼CN(0, σ2E ).
It should be noted that we consider the non-colluding
eavesdropping scenario where each eavesdropper relies on
itself to overhear and decode the messages and there is no
information exchange between the eavesdroppers.
In this paper, the worst-case system sum secrecy rate is used
to evaluate the system performance in the multiuser scenario,
which can be expressed as
Rs =
M∑
i=1
min
k
Rki
=
M∑
i=1
min
k
(
log(1 + SINRDi )−log(1 + SINREk )
)
= log
( M∏
i=1
(1 + SINRDi )
)
−log
( M∏
i=1
max
k
(1 + SINREk )
)
,
(8)
where Rs denotes the system sum secrecy rate, SINRDi
and SINREk denote the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the destination user Di and the eavesdropper Ek ,
respectively.
Then, according to (6), the SINR at the i-th destination user
Di is
SINRDi =
|hH (θBDi )wi |2
M∑
m=1
m,i
|hH (θBDi )wm |2+
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBDi )ql |2+σ2D
. (9)
And according to (7), the SINR at the k-th eavesdropper Ek
intending to intercept the i-th destination user is
SINREk =
|hH (θBEk )wi |2
M∑
m=1
m,i
|hH (θBEk )wm |2+
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBEk )ql |2+σ2E
. (10)
Now, according to (8), (9) and (10), the optimization prob-
lem that maximizes the worst-case system sum secrecy rate
under the constraint of the total transmit power of the BS is
constructed as shown in (11) on the following page.
C. Direction Angle Estimation Error Following Von Mises
Distribution
Since the BS is assumed to have the imperfect knowledge
of the direction angles toward the eavesdroppers, the actual
4maximize
{wi }, {ql }
log
( M∏
i=1
M∑
m=1
|hH (θBDi )wm |2+
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBDi )ql |2+σ2D
M∑
m=1
m,i
|hH (θBDi )wm |2+
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBDi )ql |2+σ2D
)
− log
( M∏
i=1
max
k
M∑
m=1
|hH (θBEk )wm |2+
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBEk )ql |2+σ2E
M∑
m=1
m,i
|hH (θBEk )wm |2+
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBEk )ql |2+σ2E
)
s.t.
L∑
l=1
‖ql ‖2 +
M∑
i=1
‖wi ‖2 ≤ Pt . (11)
direction angle between the BS and the k-th eavesdropper is
expressed as
θBEk = θˆBEk + ∆θBEk , k = 1, · · · ,K, (12)
where θˆBEk is the estimated direction angle between the BS
and the k-th eavesdropper, ∆θBEk denotes the estimation error
which is assumed to follow the Von Mises distribution [27]
over the interval [−∆θmax,∆θmax]. Note that ∆θmax represents
the maximum angle error and is a positive value up to the
beamwidth between the first nulls [21].
The Von Mises distribution, also known as the circular
normal distribution, is a continuous probability distribution on
the circle and mainly describes the information related to the
directional angles. In [23], the Von Mises distribution was con-
sidered to be the best statistical model for circular parameters
such as the direction angle. Subsequently, according to (12),
the estimation error of the direction angle should also follow
the Von Mises distribution.
The probability density function (PDF) of the Von Mises
distribution is
f (θ |µ, κ) = e
κ cos(θ−µ)
2piI0(κ) , θ ∈ [−pi, pi), (13)
where θ represents the estimation error of the direction angle,
µ denotes the mean of θ, κ ≥ 0 denotes the concentration
parameter and controls the width of θ, and In with n = 0 is
the modified Bessel function of the first kind with order n
computed by
In(x) = 1
pi
∫ pi
0
ex cos(t) cos(nt)dt, x ∈ (−∞,∞). (14)
III. ROBUST BEAMFORMING MATRIX DESIGN
WITH VON-MISES DISTRIBUTED DIRECTION
ANGLE ERROR AT EAVESDROPPERS
In the previous section, the estimation error of the direction
angle toward each eavesdropper has been modeled to follow
the Von Mises distribution. Then in order to maximize the
worst-case system sum secrecy rate, in this section, we propose
a Von Mises distribution-SSRM (VMD-SSRM) robust DM
scheme. The procedure of the proposed scheme, i.e., the design
of the optimal beamforming matrices, will be illustrated as
follows.
In (11), the item |hH (θBEk )wm |2 can be expressed as
|hH (θBEk )wm |2 =
Tr
(
h(θBEk )hH (θBEk )wmwHm
)
= Tr
(
h(θˆBEk + ∆θBEk )hH (θˆBEk + ∆θBEk )wmwHm
)
.
(15)
To simplify the expression, we define
HBEk =E
{
h(θˆBEk + ∆θBEk )hH (θˆBEk + ∆θBEk )
}
, k ∈ K, (16)
where HBEk ∈ CN×N . The necessity of the expectation in (16)
is explained as follows. If we remove the expectation, since
∆θBEk is a random variable, then HBEk would be random as
well as the objective function of (11), and it would be very
difficult to find a solution to (11).
Let HBEk (u, v) denote the u-th row and the v-th column
entry of HBEk , then HBEk (u, v) can be written as
HBEk (u, v) = Υ1k(u, v) − jΥ2k(u, v). (17)
The detailed procedure for deriving Υ1k(u, v) and Υ2k(u, v)
based on the Von Mises distribution is shown in Appendix
A. And Υ1k(u, v) and Υ2k(u, v) are expressed as (A17) and
(A24), respectively.
In order to make (11) more tractable, we substitute the new
matrix H(θBDi ) = h(θBDi )hH (θBDi ) as well as the positive
semi-definite matrix variables Wi = wiwHi , Q =
L∑
l=1
qlqHl into
(11). Then the optimization problem (11) can be rewritten in
a simple form as shown in (18) at the top of the next page.
By solving the problem (18), we can obtain the optimal
information beamforming matrices {Wi} and the AN beam-
forming matrix Q. However, the objective function in (18)
is non-convex and difficult to tackle, as it comprises the
logarithms of the product of fractional quadratic functions.
In order to solve this problem, we employ the semi-definite
relaxation and the first-order approximation technique based
on the Taylor expansion to transform the original problem
into a convex problem [28]. Then this convex problem can
be solved by using the convex optimization toolbox (CVX).
The specific process for converting (18) into a convex one is
illustrated as follows. First, the exponential variables are used
to substitute the numerators and denominators of the fractions
in the objective function in (18), i.e.,
epi =
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D, (19)
5maximize
{Wi },Q
log
( M∏
i=1
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+σ2D
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+σ2D
)
− log
( M∏
i=1
max
k
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+σ2E
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+σ2E
)
s.t. Tr(Q) +
M∑
i=1
Tr(Wi) ≤ Pt,
Wi,Q  0, ∀i. (18)
eqi =
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D, (20)
eck =
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E, (21)
edi,k =
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E . (22)
Then according to the properties of exponential and log-
arithmic functions, the objective function in (18) can be
rewritten as
M∑
i=1
((pi − qi) − max
k=1, · · · ,K
(ck − di,k)
)
. (23)
Meanwhile pi , qi , ck , di,k are constrained by the right hand
sides of each equation in (19), (20), (21) and (22). So the prob-
lem (18) can be transformed to a semi-definite programming
(SDP) problem as
maximize
S
M∑
i=1
((pi − qi) − max
k=1, · · · ,K
(ck − di,k)
)
(24a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D ≥ epi , ∀i, (24b)
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D ≤ eqi , ∀i, (24c)
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E ≤ eck , ∀k, (24d)
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E ≥ edi,k , ∀i, ∀k, (24e)
Tr(Q) +
M∑
i=1
Tr(Wi) ≤ Pt, (24f)
Wi,Q  0, ∀i. (24g)
The objective function (24a) is a concave function because
it comprises a sum of the affine functions minus a sum of
the maxima of the affine functions. However, the constraints
(24c) and (24d) are non-convex. In order to transform these
two constraints into convex ones, eqi and eck can be linearized
based on the first-order Taylor approximation as
eqi = eq¯i (qi − q¯i + 1), (25)
eck = ec¯k (ck − c¯k + 1), (26)
where
q¯i = ln
( M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+σ2D
)
, (27)
c¯k = ln
( M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E
)
, (28)
are the points around which the approximation are made. So
the problem (11) eventually becomes
maximize
S
M∑
i=1
((pi − qi) − max
k=1, · · · ,K
(ck − di,k)
)
(29a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D ≥ epi , ∀i,
(29b)
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D
≤ eq¯i (qi − q¯i + 1), ∀i, (29c)
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E
≤ ec¯k (ck − c¯k + 1), ∀k, (29d)
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
HBEkWm
)
+ Tr
(
HBEkQ
)
+ σ2E ≥ edi,k , ∀i, ∀k, (29e)
Tr(Q) +
M∑
i=1
Tr(Wi) ≤ Pt, (29f)
Wi,Q  0, ∀i. (29g)
6As a convex problem, (29) can be solved iteratively by the
Algorithm 1 using the CVX optimization software. According
to the definition, Wm has to satisfy rank(Wm) = 1, so the
optimal Wm of (29) should satisfy this rank-one constraint.
Otherwise the randomization technology [29] would be uti-
lized to get a rank-one approximation.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for solving the problem (29)
1: Given {w˜i, i = 1, · · · , M } and {q˜l, l = 1, · · · , L } randomly that
are feasible to (29);
2: Set W˜i [0] = w˜i w˜Hi , i = 1, · · · , M , Q˜[0] =
L∑
l=1
q˜l q˜Hl and set n=0;
3: Repeat
4: Substituting W˜i [n] and Q˜[n] into (27) and (28) yields q¯i [n + 1]
and c¯k [n + 1];
5: Increment n = n + 1;
6: Substituting q¯i [n] and c¯k [n] into (29) yields the optimal solution
W˜i [n] and Q˜[n];
7: Until convergence;
8: Obtain Q˜ and {w∗i, i = 1, · · · , M } by decomposition of
W˜i [n] = (w∗i )(w∗i )H for all i in the case of rank(W˜i [n]) = 1;
otherwise the randomization technology [29] would be utilized to get
a rank-one approximation.
IV. ROBUST BEAMFORMING MATRIX DESIGN
WITH MAXIMUM DIRECTION ANGLE ERROR AT
EAVESDROPPERS
In the previous section, the system was designed based on
the Von Mises distribution of the eavesdropper direction angle
error. Thus the system sum secrecy rate was maximized for all
possible values of the direction angle error. Nevertheless, it is
also important to exclusively investigate the case of the worst
direction angle error. Thus in this section, the system will be
designed when the eavesdropper direction angle error reaches
its maximum value and the robust beamforming matrices
are obtained by the maximum angle estimation error-SSRM
(MAEE-SSRM) method.
If the direction angle estimation error toward each eaves-
dropper is bounded, we can prove that the channel estimation
error between the BS and each eavesdropper is norm-bounded
(the detailed procedure is illustrated in Appendix B). Then
the channel between the BS and the k-th eavesdropper can be
expressed as
h(θBEk ) = h(θˆBEk )+∆hBEk , ‖∆hBEk ‖ ≤ εk, k = 1,· · ·,K, (30)
where h(θˆBEk ) is the estimated channel between the BS and
the k-th eavesdropper, ∆hBEk is the channel estimation error,
and εk is the bound of the norm of the channel estimation
error of the k-th eavesdropper.
Then we derive the lower bound of the objective function
in (11). For that purpose, we first derive the upper and lower
bounds of |hH (θBEk )wm |2 and |hH (θBEk )ql |2 in (11). The
upper bound of |hH (θBEk )wm |2 is
|hH (θBEk )wm |2
= hH (θBEk )wmwHmh(θBEk )
=
(
hH (θˆBEk ) + ∆hHBEk
)
wmwHm
(
h(θˆBEk ) + ∆hBEk
)
= hH (θˆBEk )wmwHmh(θˆBEk )+2Re
{
∆hHBEkwmw
H
mh(θˆBEk )
}
(a)≤ hH (θˆBEk )wmwHmh(θˆBEk ) + 2εk ‖wmwHmh(θˆBEk )‖.
(31)
Similarly, the lower bound of |hH (θBEk )wm |2 is
|hH (θBEk )wm |2
= hH (θˆBEk )wmwHmh(θˆBEk )+2Re
{
∆hHBEkwmw
H
mh(θˆBEk )
}
≥ hH (θˆBEk )wmwHmh(θˆBEk ) − 2εk ‖wmwHmh(θˆBEk )‖.
(32)
It should be noted that in (31) and (32) the second-order
error term ∆hHBEkwmw
H
m∆hBEk is omitted because it is quite
small compared to the other two terms. And note that the
step (a) in (31) results from the following derivation process.
According to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality theorem, we have
|xHy| ≤ ‖x‖‖y‖. (33)
Since the inequality
− |xHy| ≤ Re{xHy} ≤ |xHy|, (34)
is obviously true, then we can obtain the following inequality
− ‖x‖‖y‖ ≤ Re{xHy} ≤ ‖x‖‖y‖. (35)
The inequality in (35) holds with equality when and only when
x and y are linearly dependent. The derivation of the step (a)
in (31) is completed.
Similarly, the upper bound of |hH (θBEk )ql |2 is
|hH (θBEk )ql |2
≤ hH (θˆBEk )qlqHl h(θˆBEk ) + 2εk ‖qlqHl h(θˆBEk )‖,
(36)
and the lower bounds of |hH (θBEk )ql |2 is
|hH (θBEk )ql |2
≥ hH (θˆBEk )qlqHl h(θˆBEk ) − 2εk ‖qlqHl h(θˆBEk )‖.
(37)
With the upper and lower bounds of |hH (θBEk )wm |2 and
|hH (θBEk )ql |2 substituted into (11), the maximization of the
lower bound of the objective function in (11) can be written
as (38) at the top of the next page. So we have converted
(11) into a problem to maximize the lower bound of the sum
secrecy rate. But (38) is non-convex and difficult to tackle.
To solve this problem, we use the change of variable method
in [28]. First, the new matrices H(θBDi ) = h(θBDi )hH (θBDi ),
H(θˆBEk ) = h(θˆBEk )hH (θˆBEk ) and the positive semi-definite
matrix variables Wi = wiwHi , Q =
L∑
l=1
qlqHl are introduced
to make (38) more tractable. And (38) can be rewritten in a
simple form as shown in (39) at the top of this page.
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{wi }, {ql }
log
( M∏
i=1
M∑
m=1
|hH (θBDi )wm |2 +
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBDi )ql |2 + σ2D
M∑
m=1
m,i
|hH (θBDi )wm |2 +
L∑
l=1
|hH (θBDi )ql |2 + σ2D
)
−
log
( M∏
i=1
max
k
M∑
m=1
(hH (θˆBEk )wmwHmh(θˆBEk )+2εk ‖wmwHmh(θˆBEk )‖)+
L∑
l=1
(hH (θˆBEk )qlqHl h(θˆBEk )+2εk ‖qlqHl h(θˆBEk )‖)+σ2E
M∑
m=1
m,i
(hH (θˆBEk )wmwHmh(θˆBEk )−2εk ‖wmwHmh(θˆBEk )‖)+
L∑
l=1
(hH (θˆBEk )qlqHl h(θˆBEk )−2εk ‖qlqHl h(θˆBEk )‖)+σ2E
)
.
(38)
maximize
{Wi },Q
log
( M∏
i=1
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D
)
−
log
( M∏
i=1
max
k
M∑
m=1
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm)+2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q)+2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+σ2E
M∑
m=1
m,i
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm)−2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q)−2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+σ2E
)
s.t. Tr(Q) +
M∑
i=1
Tr(Wi) ≤ Pt,
Wi,Q  0, ∀i. (39)
Then, the numerators and denominators of the fractions in
the objective function in (39) are substituted by the exponential
variables as follows
esi =
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D, (40)
eti =
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D, (41)
eak =
M∑
m=1
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) + 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) + 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E,
(42)
ebi,k =
M∑
m=1
m,i
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) − 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) − 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E .
(43)
Thus we can rewrite the objective function in (39) as
M∑
i=1
((si − ti) − max
k=1, · · · ,K
(ak − bi,k)
)
. (44)
At the same time, si , ti , ak , bi,k are constrained by each
expression at the right hand sides of (40), (41), (42) and (43).
Then (39) can be rewritten as
maximize
S1
M∑
i=1
((si − ti) − max
k=1, · · · ,K
(ak − bi,k)
)
(45a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D ≥ esi , ∀i, (45b)
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D ≤ eti , ∀i, (45c)
M∑
m=1
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) + 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) + 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E ≤ eak , ∀k, (45d)
M∑
m=1
m,i
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) − 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
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(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) − 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E ≥ ebi,k ,∀i,∀k,
(45e)
Tr(Q) +
M∑
i=1
Tr(Wi) ≤ Pt, (45f)
Wi,Q  0, ∀i. (45g)
Now, the objective function (45a) is concave, but the con-
straints (45c) and (45d) are non-convex. In order to convert
these two constraints into convex ones, we linearize the
exponential terms eti and eak based on the first-order Taylor
approximation as
eti = et¯i (ti − t¯i + 1), (46)
eak = ea¯k (ak − a¯k + 1), (47)
where
t¯i = ln
( M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D
)
, (48)
a¯k = ln
( M∑
m=1
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) + 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) + 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E
)
,
(49)
are the points around which the linearization are made. Thus
the problem (11) finally becomes
maximize
S1
M∑
i=1
((si − ti) − max
k=1, · · · ,K
(ak − bi,k)
)
(50a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D ≥ esi , ∀i, (50b)
M∑
m=1
m,i
Tr
(
H(θBDi )Wm
)
+ Tr
(
H(θBDi )Q
)
+ σ2D
≤ et¯i (ti − t¯i + 1), ∀i, (50c)
M∑
m=1
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) + 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) + 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E
≤ ea¯k (ak − a¯k + 1), ∀k, (50d)
M∑
m=1
m,i
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Wm) − 2εk ‖Wmh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+
(
Tr(H(θˆBEk )Q) − 2εk ‖Qh(θˆBEk )‖
)
+ σ2E ≥ ebi,k ,∀i,∀k,
(50e)
Tr(Q) +
M∑
i=1
Tr(Wi) ≤ Pt, (50f)
Wi,Q  0, ∀i. (50g)
Now, (50) is a convex problem and can be solved iteratively
by Algorithm 2 using CVX.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for solving the problem (50)
1: Given {w˜i, i = 1, · · · , M } and {q˜l, l = 1, · · · , L } randomly that
are feasible to (50);
2: Set W˜i [0] = w˜i w˜Hi , i = 1, · · · , M , Q˜[0] =
L∑
l=1
q˜l q˜Hl and set n=0;
3: Repeat
4: Substituting W˜i [n] and Q˜[n] into (48) and (49) yields t¯i [n + 1]
and a¯k [n + 1];
5: Increment n = n + 1;
6: Substituting t¯i [n] and a¯k [n] into (50) yields the optimal solution
W˜i [n] and Q˜[n];
7: Until convergence;
8: Obtain Q˜ and {w∗i, i = 1, · · · , M } by decomposition of
W˜i [n] = (w∗i )(w∗i )H for all i in the case of rank(W˜i [n]) = 1;
otherwise the randomization technology [29] would be utilized to get
a rank-one approximation.
Next, we derive the complexity of our two proposed meth-
ods. According to [30], the per-iteration complexity of the
proposed VMD-SSRM method and MAEE-SSRM method can
be both approximately calculated as
Compper−iter =
O
(√
(KM + K + 2M + 1)(2N + 2) + KM + (M + 1)N
no[n2o + no((KM + K + 2M + 1)(2N + 2)2 + KM2+
(M + 1)N2) + (KM + K + 2M + 1)(2N + 2)3 + KM3+
(M + 1)N3]ln(1

)
)
,
(51)
where N , M and K are the number of transmit antennas at
the BS, the number of destination users and the number of
eavesdroppers, respectively. no = (K + 3)M + K + (M + 1)N2
is the dimension of real design variables, and  is a computa-
tional accuracy. Then the complexity of VMD-SSRM method
is Compper−iter · IVMDmax while the complexity of MAEE-
SSRM method is Compper−iter · IMAEEmax , where IVMDmax
and IMAEEmax are the iteration times of VMD-SSRM method
and MAEE-SSRM method, respectively.
According to (51), the per-iteration complexity of VMD-
SSRM method and MAEE-SSRM method increases with the
increase of N , M and K . When N , M and K are small, for
example, N = 4, M = 2, K = 1, the complexity of proposed
VMD-SSRM method and MAEE-SSRM method is slightly
higher than that of ZF method and SLNR method.
V. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the simulation results to evaluate
the performance of our proposed VMD-SSRM method and
MAEE-SSRM method. Our methods are compared to ZF
method and SLNR method. The two methods are based on the
schemes in [24] and [25], respectively, but the eavesdropping
channels in these two methods are estimated in the same way
as our VMD-SSRM method. The simulation parameters are
set as shown in Table I, unless otherwise stated.
The distance between the BS and each destination user
is set to 80m, while the distance between the BS and each
eavesdropper is set to 50m. Fig. 2 shows the locations of
the BS, destination users and eavesdroppers in the Cartesian
coordinate system.
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SIMULATION PARAMETERS SETTING
Parameters Values
The number of antennas at the BS (N ) 6
The number of destination users (M) 2
The number of eavesdroppers (K) 4
The maximum angle estimation error toward each
eavesdropper (∆θmax)
6◦
The mean of the angle estimation error (µ) 0
The concentration parameter of the angle
estimation error (κ) 100
The power of receiver noise (σ2D , σ
2
E ) −30dBm
The transmit power of the BS (Pt ) 40dBm
The direction angles toward the destination users
({θBD1, θBD2 })
{ pi6 , pi3 }
The direction angles toward the eavesdroppers
({θBE1, θBE2, θBE3, θBE4 }) {−
pi
12,
pi
12,
pi
4 ,
5pi
12 }
BS
E4
E3
E2
E1
D1
D2
y
x
Fig. 2. The locations of the BS, destination users and eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 3. Sum secrecy rate versus the transmit power of the BS for N = 6,
M = 2, K = 4, ∆θmax = 6◦.
Fig. 3 shows how the sum secrecy rate changes with the
transmit power of the BS. It can be observed that the sum se-
crecy rate grows with the increase of the transmit power at the
BS for all four methods. The reason is explained as follows.
When the transmit power of the BS increases, the destination
user’s SINR increases more than the eavesdropper’s SINR,
because these four methods all try to provide the eavesdroppers
less confidential signal and more AN by designing the best
signal beamforming matrix and AN beamforming matrix, thus
limiting the eavesdropper’s SINR. It can also be observed that
our VMD-SSRM method achieves better sum secrecy rate than
our MAEE-SSRM method. The reason is that MAEE-SSRM
method aims to maximize the system performance in the worst
case when the estimation error of direction angle toward each
eavesdropper is the largest, while VMD-SSRM method can
deal with more cases because most angle estimation errors
are taken into consideration through expectation computation.
Moreover, the sum secrecy rate of SLNR method increases
slowly. The reason is explained as follows. As in [25], SLNR
method fixes the power allocation factors for both confidential
signal and AN, and the power allocation factor for confidential
signal is much higher than that of AN. So when transmit power
of the BS increases, the power allocated to confidential signal
is much more than that of AN, providing the eavesdroppers
more chance to decipher confidential signals. So the sum
secrecy rate of SLNR method increases very slowly.
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Fig. 4. Sum secrecy rate versus the number of transmit antennas at the BS
for M = 2, K = 4, Pt = 40dBm, ∆θmax = 6◦.
Fig. 4 compares the sum secrecy rate against different num-
ber of transmit antennas at the BS. It can be seen that when
the number of transmit antennas increases, the sum secrecy
rates of four methods also increase. The reason is explained as
follows. These four methods all try to obtain the optimal sum
secrecy rate by designing the optimal signal beamforming vec-
tors and AN beamforming vectors. On the other hand, when
the BS has more antennas, the beams generated by the BS
can be narrower. So the signal beams will be more precisely
directed toward destination users and the AN beams will also
be more precisely directed toward eavesdroppers. It can also be
observed that when the number of transmit antennas exceeds
10
some value (such as 16), the sum secrecy rates of four methods
increase slowly. The reason can be explained as follows. When
the number of transmit antennas exceeds 16, the dimension of
the beamforming vectors is already high enough to concentrate
the confidential signal on the corresponding desired user as
well as concentrate the AN on eavesdroppers. Since the system
secrecy performance is already optimized, merely increasing
the number of transmit antennas cannot effectively improve
the system secrecy performance any more.
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Fig. 5. Sum secrecy rate versus the maximum angle estimation error for
N = 6, M = 2, K = 4, Pt = 40dBm.
In Fig. 5, fixing the transmit power of the BS, we investigate
the impact of the maximum angle estimation error ∆θmax on
the sum secrecy rate. With the increase of ∆θmax, the sum
secrecy rates of the four methods degrade slowly. The reason
is that these four methods all take the estimation error of
direction angle toward each eavesdropper into consideration
when constructing the optimization problems. Similar to our
VMD-SSRM method, the ZF method and the SLNR method
both obtain the expectation of eavesdropping channel related
coefficient on the condition of Von-Mises-distributed direction
angle estimation error. As such, they are robust against the
effects of the direction angle estimation errors. Moreover,
our proposed VMD-SSRM method and MAEE-SSRM method
obviously outperform ZF method and SLNR method. The
main reason is that both VMD-SSRM method and MAEE-
SSRM method are aiming to directly maximize the sum
secrecy rate, while ZF method and SLNR method do not take
the sum secrecy rate as the direct optimization objective. The
optimization objective of ZF method is to maximize the con-
fidential signal for each destination user whist nullify signal
interference at each destination user. On the other hand, SLNR
method aims to minimize the confidential signal leakage to
other users including all eavesdroppers and meanwhile to
maximize AN power leakage to all eavesdroppers [25].
Fig. 6 shows how the sum secrecy rate changes with the
number of the eavesdroppers. It can be observed that the sum
secrecy rates of four methods decrease when the number of the
eavesdroppers increases. The reason is explained as follows.
When there are more eavesdroppers, the confidential signal
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Fig. 6. Sum secrecy rate versus the number of the eavesdroppers for N = 6,
M = 2, {θBE1, θBE2, θBE3, θBE4, θBE5 } = {− pi12, pi12, pi4 , 5pi12 , 7pi12 }, Pt =
40dBm, ∆θmax = 6◦.
will be more likely to be wiretapped by the eavesdroppers.
Although the AN is used to interfere the eavesdroppers, since
the BS has only 6 transmit antennas, the BS cannot generate
enough AN beams to interfere the additional eavesdroppers.
It can also be observed that when the number of the eaves-
droppers exceeds 4, the sum secrecy rates of four methods
decrease slowly. The reason is that the fifth eavesdropper
E5 (as well as subsequent eavesdroppers) are set to be far
away from the destination users. Thus even if the number of
the eavesdroppers increases, the additional eavesdroppers can
hardly capture confidential signals, resulting in small effect on
the sum secrecy rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the robust beamforming
matrix design for sum secrecy rate maximization based on
directional modulation in multi-user systems. It was assumed
that the BS has the imperfect knowledge of the direction
angle toward each eavesdropper and the direction angle es-
timation errors follow the Von Mises distribution. Following
this assumption, we first proposed a VMD-SSRM method to
maximize the sum secrecy rate. In addition, to optimize the
sum secrecy rate in the case of the worst estimation error
of direction angle toward each eavesdropper, we proposed a
MAEE-SSRM method. From the analysis and the simulations,
our VMD-SSRM method and MAEE-SSRM method achieve
better sum secrecy rate than ZF method and SLNR method.
Moreover, the sum secrecy rate performance of the proposed
VMD-SSRM method is better than that of the proposed
MAEE-SSRM method.
APPENDIX A
HBEk (u, v) can be expressed as
HBEk (u, v) = E
{
hu(θˆBEk + ∆θBEk )hHv (θˆBEk + ∆θBEk )
}
. (A1)
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According to (4), (A1) can be written as
HBEk (u, v) =
gBEk
N
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
e j
2pi(v−u)l
λ cos(θˆBEk +∆θBEk )
f (∆θBEk)d(∆θBEk ).
(A2)
The exponential function in (A2) can be expanded by using
Euler’s formula as
HBEk (u, v) =
gBEk
N
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
exp
{
jαuv
(
cos(θˆBEk ) cos(∆θBEk )
− sin(θˆBEk ) sin(∆θBEk )
)}
f (∆θBEk)d(∆θBEk ),
(A3)
where αuv =
2pi(v−u)l
λ . It is assumed that ∆θmax is so small
that it approaches zero. The trigonometric functions of the
direction angle estimation error in (A3) can be expanded by
using second-order Taylor expansion. Thus we can get the
following approximate expressions
sin(∆θBEk ) ≈ ∆θBEk , (A4)
cos(∆θBEk ) ≈ 1 −
∆θ2BEk
2
. (A5)
Substituting (A4) and (A5) into (A3), we have the expression
of HBEk (u, v) as
HBEk (u, v) =
gBEk
N
e jαuv cos(θˆBEk )
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
exp
{
− jαuv
(
cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2BEk
2
+ sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)}
f (∆θBEk)d(∆θBEk ).
(A6)
According to Euler’s formula, (A6) can be further written as
HBEk (u, v) =HˆBEk(u, v)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
(
cos(ξku,v)− j sin(ξku,v)
)
f (∆θBEk)d(∆θBEk ),
(A7)
where
HˆBEk(u, v) =
gBEk
N
e jαuvcos(θˆBEk ), (A8)
denotes the u-th row and the v-th column entry of
h(θˆBEk )hH (θˆBEk ), and
ξku,v = αuv
(
cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2BEk
2
+ sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
. (A9)
For simplify, (A7) can be written as
HBEk (u, v) = Υ1k(u, v) − jΥ2k(u, v), (A10)
where
Υ1k(u, v)= HˆBEk(u, v)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
cos(ξku,v)f (∆θBEk)d(∆θBEk ),
(A11)
Υ2k(u, v)= HˆBEk(u, v)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
sin(ξku,v)f (∆θBEk)d(∆θBEk ).
(A12)
Now the task is to derive the analytic expressions of
Υ1k(u, v) and Υ2k(u, v). For this purpose, we first expand the
Cosine function in (A11) into the following form
cos(ξku,v) =
cos
(
αuv cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2BEk
2
)
cos
(
αuv sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
− sin
(
αuv cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2BEk
2
)
sin
(
αuv sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
.
(A13)
Then the second-order Taylor series is used to approximate
each term in (A13), and (A13) can be rewritten as
cos(ξku,v) =(
1 −
α2uv cos2(θˆBEk )∆θ4BEk
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) (
1 −
α2uv sin2(θˆBEk )∆θ2BEk
2
)
−
(
αuv cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2BEk
2
) (
αuv sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
.
(A14)
Expand (A14) as a sum of several terms and omit the higher
order terms about ∆θBEk , then (A14) can be further written
as
cos(ξku,v) ≈ 1 −
α2uv sin2(θˆBEk )∆θ2BEk
2
− α2uv sin(θˆBEk ) cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ3BEk
2
.
(A15)
Since the direction angle estimation error ∆θBEk is assumed
to be very small, µ is also a small value near zero. Therefore,
we can expand the trigonometric function in the Von Mises
PDF as
cos(∆θBEk − µ) ≈ 1 −
1
2
(∆θBEk − µ)2. (A16)
Combining (A11), (A15) and (A16), we can obtain the ex-
pression of Υ1k(u, v) at the top of the next page.
Note that in (A17), ∆θ1 = ∆θmax + µ, ∆θ2 = ∆θmax − µ and
the step (b) results from the following equations [31]∫ x
0
e−q
2t2dt =
√
pi
2q
erf(qx), (A18)
∫ x
0
te−q
2t2dt =
1
2q2
(1 − e−q2x2 ), (A19)
∫ x
0
t2e−q
2t2dt =
1
2q3
(√pi
2
erf(qx) − qxe−q2x2
)
, (A20)
∫ x
0
t3e−q
2t2dt =
1
2q4
(
1 − (1 + q2x2)e−q2x2
)
, (A21)
where erf(x) represents the error function defined as
erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt . (A22)
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Υ1k(u, v) ≈ HˆBEk (u, v)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
(
1 − α
2
uv sin2(θˆBEk )
2
∆θ2BEk −
α2uv sin(θˆBEk ) cos(θˆBEk )
2
∆θ3BEk
)
f (∆θBEk )d(∆θBEk )
(b)≈ HˆBEk (u, v)e
κ
2piI0(κ)
{√ pi
2κ
(
erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ1) + erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ2)
)
− α
2
uv sin2(θˆBEk )
2κ
( (1 + κµ2)√pi√
2κ
(
erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ1) + erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ2)
)
− ∆θ2e− κ2 ∆θ21 − ∆θ1e− κ2 ∆θ22
)
− α
2
uv sin(θˆBEk ) cos(θˆBEk )
2κ
( (3 + κµ2)µ√pi√
2κ
(
erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ1) + erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ2)
)
+ (2
κ
+ ∆θ21 − 3µ)e−
κ
2 ∆θ
2
1 − (2
κ
+ ∆θ22 + 3µ)e−
κ
2 ∆θ
2
2
)}
. (A17)
Υ2k(u, v) ≈ HˆBEk (u, v)
∫ ∆θmax
−∆θmax
(αuv cos(θˆBEk )
2
∆θ2BEK + αuv sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEK
)
f (∆θBEk )d(∆θBEk )
≈ HˆBEk (u, v)e
κ
2piI0(κ)
{αuv cos(θˆBEk )
2κ
( (1 + κµ2)√pi√
2κ
(
erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ1) + erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ2)
)
− ∆θ2e− κ2 ∆θ21 − ∆θ1e− κ2 ∆θ22
)
+ αuv sin(θˆBEk )
(
µ
√
pi
2κ
(
erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ1) + erf(
√
κ
2
∆θ2)
)
+
1
κ
(e− κ2 ∆θ21 − e− κ2 ∆θ22 )
)}
. (A24)
Similarly, sin(ξku,v) in (A12) can be approximately expressed
as
sin(ξku,v) ≈(αuv cos(θˆBEk )
2
∆θ2BEk
) (
1 −
α2uv sin2(θˆBEk )∆θ2BEk
2
)
+
(
1 −
α2uv cos2(θˆBEk )∆θ4BEk
8
) (
αuv sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
≈ αuv cos(θˆBEk )
2
∆θ2BEk + αuv sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk .
(A23)
Then, combining (A12), (A16) and (A23), we can obtain the
expression of Υ2k(u, v) at the top of this page.
Now, combining (A10), (A17) and (A24), we can finally
obtain the analytic expression of HBEk (u, v) and the proof is
completed.
APPENDIX B
The p-th entry of h(θBEk ) can be expressed as
hp(θBEk ) =√
gBEk
N
e−j2pi
(p−(N+1)/2)l
λ cos(θˆBEk +∆θBEk )
=
√
gBEk
N
e
−jαp
(
cos(θˆBEk ) cos(∆θBEk )−sin(θˆBEk ) sin(∆θBEk )
)
,
(B1)
where αp =
2pi(p−(N+1)/2)l
λ . Since ∆θmax is a minimum value
nears zero, we can expand the trigonometric functions of the
direction angle estimation error in (B1) by using second-order
Taylor expansion, and (B1) is transformed as follows
hp(θBEk ) =√
gBEk
N
e
−jαp
(
cos(θˆBEk )(1−
∆θ2
BEk
2 )−sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
=
√
gBEk
N
e−jαpcos(θˆBEk)e
jαp
(
cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2
BEk
2 +sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
= hp(θˆBEk )
(
cos(ξkp) + j sin(ξkp)
)
= Γ1k(p) + jΓ2k(p).
(B2)
where
hp(θˆBEk ) =
√
gBEk
N
e−jαpcos(θˆBEk ) (B3)
denotes the p-th entry of h(θˆBEk ), and
ξkp = αp
(
cos(θˆBEk )
∆θ2BEk
2
+ sin(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
)
, (B4)
Γ1k(p) = hp(θˆBEk ) cos(ξkp), (B5)
Γ2k(p) = hp(θˆBEk ) sin(ξkp). (B6)
Then performing the same operation on the trigonometric
functions in (B5) and (B6) as shown in APPENDIX A, we
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finally obtain the expression of hp(θBEk ),
hp(θBEk ) =
hp(θˆBEk )
(
cos(ξkp) + j sin(ξkp)
)
= hp(θˆBEk ) + jαp sin(θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
+
1
2
αp
(
j cos(θˆBEk ) − αp sin2(θˆBEk )
)
hp(θˆBEk )∆θ2BEk
− 1
4
α2p sin(2θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )∆θ3BEk
= hp(θˆBEk ) + ∆hkp,
(B7)
where
∆hkp =
jαp sin(θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )∆θBEk
+
1
2
αp
(
j cos(θˆBEk ) − αp sin2(θˆBEk )
)
hp(θˆBEk )∆θ2BEk
− 1
4
α2p sin(2θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )∆θ3BEk
(B8)
is the p-th entry of the channel estimation error of the k-th
eavesdropper.
Since the direction angle estimation error satisfies ∆θBEk ∈
[−∆θmax,∆θmax], and ∆θmax is a minimum value nears zero,
then we can omit the terms of the second-order and the third-
order of ∆θBEk in (B8). Therefore, ∆h
k
p can be approximately
rewritten as
∆hkp ≈ jαp sin(θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )∆θBEk , (B9)
and the modulus of ∆hkp is
|∆hkp | = | jαp sin(θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )| |∆θBEk |. (B10)
Apparently, |∆hkp | is a monotonically increasing function
with respect to |∆θBEk |. Therefore, |∆hkp | can take the maxi-
mum value when and only when ∆θBEk equals to the maxi-
mum value ∆θmax or the minimum value −∆θmax, i.e.,
|∆hkp | ≤ | jαp sin(θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )| |∆θmax |. (B11)
It shows that |∆hkp | is bounded, then each entry in |∆hBEk |
is also bounded, thus |∆hBEk | is norm-bounded, which means
that the channel estimation error of the eavesdroppers are
norm-bounded and the proof is completed.
We use εk to represent the maximum value of the bound
of the norm of the channel estimation error of the k-th
eavesdropper, then
εk =
√√ N∑
p=1
|αp sin(θˆBEk )hp(θˆBEk )∆θmax |2. (B12)
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